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Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
exports.isActionableStatus = isActionableStatus;
exports.shouldSkipCredentialPayloadStrategy = shouldSkipCredentialPayloadStrategy;
exports.applyStrategy = applyStrategy;
const PassmanCrypto_1 = require("../PassmanCrypto");
const ShareService_1 = require("../ShareService");
const payloadCrypto_1 = require("./payloadCrypto");
const types_1 = require("./types");
function isActionableStatus(status) {
return status === 'needs_rewrap' || status === 'shared_key_mismatch' || status === 'partially_broken';
}
/**
* Originally-ok payload (classify dropped fieldKeyIds / recoveredPreview) plus files that need a rewrap:
* skip payload rewrite and only run the file blob phase.
*/
function shouldSkipCredentialPayloadStrategy(hit) {
const filesNeedRewrap = hit.fileHits.some((fileHit) => fileHit.status === 'needs_rewrap');
if (!filesNeedRewrap) {
return false;
}
if (hit.status === 'shared_key_mismatch' || hit.status === 'partially_broken') {
return false;
}
return hit.fieldKeyIds === undefined;
}
/**
* Just the replacement assignment on the given data structures, no calls to the server.
*/
function replaceCredentialInVault(vault, oldCredential, newCredential) {
const index = vault.credentials.indexOf(oldCredential);
Eif (index !== -1) {
vault.credentials[index] = newCredential;
}
}
/**
* Encrypts `compromised = false` on `credential` using whatever payload key {@link Credential} would pick
* (vault key, shared_key, or ACL key). Caller must have already set `overwriteVaultKey` / `shared_key` ciphertext.
*/
function persistEncryptedFalseCompromisedIfUnencryptedNull(credential) {
if ((0, payloadCrypto_1.isUnencryptedCompromisedANullString)(credential.getEncrypted())) {
credential.compromised = false;
}
}
/**
* Decrypts with the password of `hit.workingKeyId`, re-encrypts like {@link Credential.reEncryptAsClone} would for a
* healthy owned credential, and (unless dryRun) uploads + swaps the live credential in `vault.credentials`.
*/
async function repairOwned(vault, credential, hit, candidates, preferred, dryRun) {
const decryptedData = (0, payloadCrypto_1.decryptRecoverablePayload)(credential.getEncrypted(), hit, candidates);
if (dryRun) {
return;
}
const newCredential = credential.clone();
newCredential.overwriteVaultKey = preferred.password;
newCredential.updateData(decryptedData);
newCredential.skip_revision = true;
const response = await newCredential.update();
if (!response) {
throw new Error('Server rejected the credential update.');
}
replaceCredentialInVault(vault, credential, newCredential);
}
/**
* Only rewraps the shared_key ciphertext from the old to the preferred vault key;
* the payload (still keyed by the unchanged, decrypted shared_key) is left untouched,
* except for persisting encrypted `false` when `compromised` is the unencrypted `"null"` sentinel.
*/
async function repairSharedByUsWrapper(vault, credential, hit, candidates, preferred, dryRun) {
const fromCandidate = (0, payloadCrypto_1.requireCandidate)(candidates, hit.workingKeyId, 'working');
const wrapperCiphertext = credential.getEncrypted().shared_key;
Iif (wrapperCiphertext === undefined || wrapperCiphertext === null) {
throw new Error('Credential has no shared_key wrapper to rewrap.');
}
const decryptedSharedKey = PassmanCrypto_1.PassmanCrypto.decryptString(wrapperCiphertext, fromCandidate.password);
if (dryRun) {
return;
}
const newCredential = credential.clone();
newCredential.set_share_key = true;
newCredential.skip_revision = true;
newCredential.overwriteVaultKey = preferred.password;
newCredential.getEncrypted().shared_key = PassmanCrypto_1.PassmanCrypto.encryptString(decryptedSharedKey, preferred.password);
// payload is keyed by shared_key; persist encrypted false under that key, not the vault key
persistEncryptedFalseCompromisedIfUnencryptedNull(newCredential);
const response = await newCredential.update();
Iif (!response) {
throw new Error('Server rejected the credential update.');
}
replaceCredentialInVault(vault, credential, newCredential);
}
/**
* Restores the shared-by-us model when `shared_key` decrypts but some payload fields were encrypted with a vault
* key instead: decrypts each recovered field with whichever key actually opens it, rewraps the shared_key to the
* preferred vault key, and re-encrypts those fields under the shared key again.
*/
async function repairSharedKeyMismatch(vault, credential, hit, candidates, preferred, dryRun) {
const wrapperCandidate = (0, payloadCrypto_1.requireCandidate)(candidates, hit.wrapperKeyId, 'shared_key wrapper');
const encrypted = credential.getEncrypted();
const wrapperCiphertext = encrypted.shared_key;
Iif (wrapperCiphertext === undefined || wrapperCiphertext === null) {
throw new Error('Credential has no shared_key wrapper to restore.');
}
const decryptedSharedKey = PassmanCrypto_1.PassmanCrypto.decryptString(wrapperCiphertext, wrapperCandidate.password);
const decryptedData = (0, payloadCrypto_1.decryptRecoverablePayload)(encrypted, hit, candidates, {
[types_1.SHARED_KEY_PROBE_ID]: decryptedSharedKey
});
if (dryRun) {
return;
}
const newCredential = credential.clone();
newCredential.set_share_key = true;
newCredential.skip_revision = true;
newCredential.overwriteVaultKey = preferred.password;
newCredential.getEncrypted().shared_key = PassmanCrypto_1.PassmanCrypto.encryptString(decryptedSharedKey, preferred.password);
newCredential.updateData(decryptedData);
const response = await newCredential.update();
Iif (!response) {
throw new Error('Server rejected the credential update.');
}
replaceCredentialInVault(vault, credential, newCredential);
}
/**
* `shared_key` is set, so clients refuse the vault key, but no candidate can open the wrapper.
* Payload fields that do open with a vault key are re-encrypted under the preferred vault key and
* `shared_key` is cleared (`unshare_action`) so the credential is owned again.
* ACL rows are left in place: this recovers the owner's copy, it does not unshare recipients.
*/
async function repairClearUndecryptableSharedKey(vault, credential, hit, candidates, preferred, dryRun) {
const decryptedData = (0, payloadCrypto_1.decryptRecoverablePayload)(credential.getEncrypted(), hit, candidates);
Iif (dryRun) {
return;
}
const newCredential = credential.clone();
newCredential.skip_revision = true;
newCredential.unshare_action = true;
newCredential.overwriteVaultKey = preferred.password;
// clear before updateData, otherwise getFieldEncryptionKey still tries the leftover shared_key
newCredential.getEncrypted().shared_key = null;
newCredential.updateData(decryptedData);
const response = await newCredential.update();
Iif (!response) {
throw new Error('Server rejected the credential update.');
}
replaceCredentialInVault(vault, credential, newCredential);
}
/**
* Rewraps the ACL encryptedSharedCredentialEncryptionKey for a credential shared with us, via
* {@link ShareService.updateSharedKeyForCredentialSharedWithUsByGuid}.
* Does not touch the owner's credential payload (usually no write access to it).
*/
async function repairAclSharedWithUs(vault, credential, hit, candidates, preferred, dryRun) {
const fromCandidate = (0, payloadCrypto_1.requireCandidate)(candidates, hit.workingKeyId, 'working');
Iif (credential.encryptedSharedCredentialEncryptionKey === undefined) {
throw new Error('Credential is not shared with us; ACL key rewrap is not applicable.');
}
const decryptedAclKey = PassmanCrypto_1.PassmanCrypto.decryptString(credential.encryptedSharedCredentialEncryptionKey, fromCandidate.password);
const reEncryptedAclKey = PassmanCrypto_1.PassmanCrypto.encryptString(decryptedAclKey, preferred.password);
if (dryRun) {
return;
}
const response = await ShareService_1.ShareService.updateSharedKeyForCredentialSharedWithUsByGuid(reEncryptedAclKey, credential.guid, vault.getServer());
Iif (!response) {
throw new Error('Server rejected the ACL shared_key update.');
}
credential.encryptedSharedCredentialEncryptionKey = reEncryptedAclKey;
credential.overwriteVaultKey = undefined;
credential.clearDecryptedDataCache();
}
async function applyStrategy(strategy, vault, credential, hit, candidates, preferred, dryRun) {
switch (strategy) {
case 'rewrap_owned':
return repairOwned(vault, credential, hit, candidates, preferred, dryRun);
case 'rewrap_shared_by_us_wrapper':
return repairSharedByUsWrapper(vault, credential, hit, candidates, preferred, dryRun);
case 'fix_shared_key_mismatch':
return repairSharedKeyMismatch(vault, credential, hit, candidates, preferred, dryRun);
case 'clear_undecryptable_shared_key':
return repairClearUndecryptableSharedKey(vault, credential, hit, candidates, preferred, dryRun);
case 'rewrap_acl_shared_with_us':
return repairAclSharedWithUs(vault, credential, hit, candidates, preferred, dryRun);
}
}
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